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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SR

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1. AEDONOR's answers to our questions appear to be quite complete. No really new information appears and they are consistent with his previous statements. Their chief value lies in the fact that they elaborate what he has said before concerning OSWALD in the USSR. The details he provides concerning KGB involvement in the OSWALD case eliminate a number of minor obscurities which were present in his earlier statements but they do not change the overall picture of OSWALD's status and activities in the USSR.

2. There are, however, some rather surprising statements in AEDONOR's replies - and these statements may call into question all or part of his story. For example:

a) he says (paragraph 5) that although the KGB recognised that OSWALD might have been an American agent, no "unusual measures" were taken to check on this possibility since it had already been decided not to let him stay in the USSR.

b) he says (paragraph 16) that the KGB did not consider recruiting Marina to report on OSWALD "because she was his wife and it was considered dangerous to recruit a wife to report on her husband."

c) he repeatedly refers

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c) he repeatedly refers to KGB recognition that OSWALD "was not normal" as the reason for KGB failure to take various steps which it could normally be expected to take vis-a-vis a foreigner like OSWALD. In other words, a lack of normality and the KGB's recognition of it provide the peg for the whole story of KGB handling of the OSWALD matter.

3. Another sequence of events, as related by AEDONOR is noteworthy. He states that Marina had no trouble marrying OSWALD because he was a resident of and working in the USSR, and that she had no difficulty leaving the country because she was married to a foreigner. This reasoning seems to overlook the fact that OSWALD had already declared his intention (via mail to the US Embassy) to leave the USSR. If this fact were known to the KGB as we must presume it was, we would expect Marina's marriage request to have been given more than routine consideration.

4. Although I believe that the Commission would be interested in the entire set of questions and answers as a follow up to the information it received earlier from AEDONOR via the FBI, perhaps you will think it not advisable to send them on at this late date, especially in view of the continuing doubts concerning AEDONOR's bona fides. There are no

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specific points in this latest information that change the OSWALD story or add significantly to it and would therefore warrant separate transmittal to the Commission in my opinion. When the results of our further checks into OSWALD's arrival time in Helsinki are in, we might send along with them AEDONOR's statement that a 2-4 day delay in obtaining a Soviet tourist visa is not uncommon.

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